Most left leaning Ethiopian scholars attribute that Ethiopia’s perennial problem originates from remote tribes not feeling belonging in the country and waging civil war, at times in collaboration with outsiders.
Provinces such as Eritrea, Tigray, Ogaden, and Wellega were well-known in this as early as the 19th century needing a heavy handed state to quell rebellions.
EPRDF stood on this ideology that this lope-sidedness in Ethiopia’s body politic has both geographical and ethnic nature.
As a solution, it came up with a new formula where the state is needed to take the administration closer to the people through federalism while at the same time ensuring representation at the center.
Tigrayans really saw the benefits of this equation after TPLF tookover. By the end of TPLF regime in 2018, Tigrayans were sufficiently integrated and emerged as central players in Ethiopia.
Tigrayans were mobilised against TPLF war especially in the early phase of the conflict as much as TPLF mobilised Tigrayans against the central government.
The war in fact didn’t linger as much longer as previous Tigray rebellions in the 20th century itself is an evidence of this irreversible social change on the ground.
I think the Oromo have done well during the EPRDF era in this regard and with more control in the center, they will do more at this time.
One potential problem that arises is the Oromo question isn’t as clearcut as others and it’s due to their diversity both in culture and way of life. Oromos are part Muslim and part Orthodox with sufficiently high Protestants. Economically, some are pastoralists and others are agricultural while same large number are urban.
Due to this diversity, nothing could be as exclusive as the current framing of the Oromo question as one distinct cultural group. And, to claim that the current Oromo politics represents the needs and equal voices of all these sections is outright betrayal to people in far flung territories with no meaningful educational and social opportunities to influence the center.
The danger and solution lies here. By putting in place specific mechanisms that ensure Oromos in remote areas such as Borana and Wellega really included, the Oromo politics can avoid having the opposite effect.
The Somali, Afar and South West ethnic groups will potentially be integrated well into Ethiopia’s political and cultural identity in a similar manner.
As time goes by, it wouldn’t be further to integrate gradually with neighbouring countries through regional cooperation as they see mutual opportunities.
This way, a truly multiethnic Ethiopia (urbanised, melting pot, democratic) will be borne out of it in few decades where it becomes impossible to separate one ethnic questions from another and everyone’s needs will be same so politics other than ethnic identity matters a lot.
The current costs of ensuring representation might seem unfair in the short-term. Yet, it pays off huge to the current urban population in the center as it opens ample economic and business opportunities just by first-mover advantage, cultural similarities as the result of expansion of metropolitan life across the country.
This is an opinion on what is perceived as ‘hegemony’, in no way it’s meant to say Oromo hegemony exists both in intent and reality.
Frontier PR Agency 